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Abstract: Can material egalitarianism (requiring, for example, the significant promotion of 
fortune) include animals in domain of the equality requirement? The problem can be illustrated 
as follows: If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice are included in this 
egalitarian requirement, then normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost 
any human. This is because their wellbeing is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, 
equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most humans to most 
mice. This view, however, seems crazy. I explore this problem and propose a solution. 
 
1. Introduction 
I shall address a problem that can arise for a certain kind of egalitarianism once sentience is 
recognized as a sufficient condition for moral standing and speciesism is rejected. Consider the 
following conditions, where wellbeing is understood to be quality of life in an absolute sense: 
 
Moderate Egalitarianism: Morality requires that, perhaps subject to certain relatively weak 
constraints, we significantly promote equality of fortune among individuals with moral standing. 
 
Fortune as Wellbeing: Fortune is wellbeing (quality of life), opportunity
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luck wellbeing. 
 
Sufficiency of Wellbeing for Moral Standing: The capacity for wellbeing is sufficient for 
moral standing. 
 
Mouse Wellbeing: Mice have the capacity for wellbeing (because they are sentient), but most 
human beings have more wellbeing (opportunity for wellbeing, or brute luck wellbeing) than 
most mice. 
 
 Given certain plausible empirical assumptions, these conditions lead to the following 
conclusion:  
 
The Problematic Conclusion: Morality requires a massive shift of resources away from most 
humans—even most of those with significantly diminished human lives—to most mice. 
 
 If equality of wellbeing is what matters, and normal mice have moral standing, then 
normal mice have a much stronger claim to resources than almost any human. This is because 
the wellbeing of normal mice is much lower than that of normal humans. Thus, equality of 
wellbeing requires a massive shift of resources away from most humans to most mice. This view, 
however, seems crazy. It may well be that mice should have much more resources than they 
currently have. It seems quite implausible, however, that morality requires that almost all mice 
have more resources than almost all humans. Of course, the same problem arises for any other 
animal species with the capacity for wellbeing. 
Of course, this apparent implausibility may simply be the result of our failure to rid 
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ourselves fully of speciesist prejudice against non-human animals. In this paper, however, I shall 
assume for the sake of argument that the conclusion is indeed wildly implausible and examine 
ways in which it can be avoided. 
Although I shall focus on the problem that arises when egalitarianism covers sentient 
non-human animals such as mice, it’s important to note that a version of the problem can arise 
even within a given species. Within a given species, such as homo sapiens, there is variability in 
the capacities and potentials for wellbeing. Equality of wellbeing requires a massive shift of 
resources from normally-abled humans to humans with innately limited capacities and potentials. 
Many people find this implication almost as absurd as the corresponding implication concerning 
mice. Most egalitarians, however, do not find this implication so absurd. They are quite willing 
to accept that genuine equality among humans may require very radical redistribution of 
resources to the disadvantaged. I therefore focus on mice, since most egalitarians will, I believe, 
find the implication there absurd. 
The general problem is not new. Most of the groundbreaking work was done by Jeff 
McMahan (1995, 2002) and others.1 My contribution is to give a more general characterization 
of the problem and to explore some new solutions. 
 
2. The problem examined 
For simplicity, throughout I shall write as if the only beings with the capacity for wellbeing are 
mice and humans. Nothing of substance depends on this. In addition, for simplicity, I will 
assume a fixed set of individuals, and thus ignore the problems that arise when choices affect 
who exists. 
 The problematic conclusion is generated in part from the assumption that mice have the 
capacity for wellbeing but typically have lower wellbeing than most humans. The first part of 
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this premiss is plausible, since mice are sentient (i.e., capable of pleasure and pain), and 
sentience is sufficient for the capacity for wellbeing (since pain and pleasure are components of 
wellbeing). The second part of the premiss—that mice typically have less wellbeing (opportunity 
for wellbeing, brute luck wellbeing) than most humans—is plausible for the following reasons. 
The typical human capacity for wellbeing is much greater than the typical mouse capacity for 
wellbeing. Part of wellbeing (what makes a life go well) is the presence of pleasure and the 
absence of pain. The typical human capacity for pain and pleasure is no less than that of mice, 
and presumably much greater, since we have, it seems plausible, more of the relevant sorts of 
neurons, neurotransmitters, receptors, etc.  In addition, our greater cognitive capacities amplify 
the magnitude of pain and pleasure. Moreover, wellbeing does not depend solely on pain and 
pleasure. It’s controversial exactly what else is relevant—accomplishments, relationships, and so 
on—but all accounts agree that typical humans have greater capacities for whatever the 
additional relevant items are. In short, typical humans have greater capacities for wellbeing than 
typical mice. This leaves open, however, whether typical humans realize greater wellbeing than 
typical mice. This is an empirical question. For some species, such as chimpanzees, it may be 
that, although their typical capacity for wellbeing is somewhat lower than ours, their typical 
realized wellbeing (e.g., if living freely in the wild) may be greater than that which we typically 
realize. For mice, however, this is quite improbable (although still an empirical question). Their 
capacity for wellbeing is radically lower than ours, and, as a result, it is quite plausible that most 
mice realize less wellbeing than most humans. 
 The problematic conclusion also rests on the claim that the capacity for wellbeing is 
sufficient for moral standing. There are two main ways of challenging this assumption. One is to 
hold that moral standing requires that the individual be rationally autonomous or psychologically 
sophisticated in related ways. Rational autonomy is clearly relevant and gives possessors a 
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special kind of moral standing (e.g., because their will is morally relevant), but, as is well known, 
it seems quite arbitrary to limit moral standing to autonomous agents. In addition to sentient 
animals, this view implausibly excludes infants and severely cognitively impaired persons from 
moral standing. The second main way to deny that mice have moral standing is to endorse a form 
of speciesism and to claim that moral standing requires that the individual be a member of a 
species (such as homo sapiens) whose ‘normal’ adult members are rationally autonomous or 
psychologically sophisticated in related ways. The problem with this view is that it is quite 
implausible that one individual would have moral standing, while another with the same 
capacities and potentials does not, merely because of a difference in species-membership (just as 
it is implausible in the cases of race and sex). In what follows, I shall assume (without any 
defense) that at least many non-autonomous animals with the capacity for wellbeing (and mice in 
particular) have moral standing.2 
 The argument for the problematic conclusion also assumes moderate egalitarianism for 
all being with moral standings. Of course, there are many ways of objecting to moderate 
egalitarianism. Some may completely reject any demands of equality. Others may hold that the 
demands of equality apply to only some beings with moral standing. Many (and probably most) 
egalitarians, for example, hold that the requirements of equality apply only to rationally 
autonomous agents. Non-autonomous sentient animals may have moral standing (and thus be 
protected against certain kinds of harm), but they have no claim to equality of wellbeing (etc.) 
with autonomous agents.3 I see little reason, however, to exclude sentient animals from the 
domain of equality, and I shall simply assume that they are included. 
Moderate egalitarianism holds that morality requires, perhaps subject to some weak 
constraints, that equality be significantly promoted. It does not necessarily require that we 
maximize equality. It may leave agents with some moral freedom to pursue their own projects 
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(i.e., options). Of course, if the requirement that equality be promoted were very weak, then few 
significant implications would follow. Moderate egalitarianism, however, requires—plausibly in 
my view—that equality be significantly promoted. In what follows, I shall tend to illustrate 
claims by assuming that equality must be maximized, but significant implications follow as long 
as the equality promotion requirement is significant. 
Moderate egalitarianism allows that there may be some relatively weak constraints on the 
promotion of fortune. One constraint that is highly plausible is that options should be Pareto 
optimal, that is, such that no one can be made better off without making someone worse off. The 
requirement of Pareto optimality is a weak efficiency requirement, and imposing it ensures that 
equality is not required when this would involve leveling down (i.e., making some worse off and 
no one better off). Let us now stipulate that a constraint on the promotion of equality of fortune 
is relatively weak just in case it does not typically rule out a high proportion of the Pareto 
optimal distributions of wellbeing. This stipulative definition ensures that imposing the 
constraint of Pareto optimality is relatively weak, and thus permits moderate egalitarianism to 
avoid the objection that it requires leveling down. This definition of relative weakness also 
allows that moderate egalitarianism may impose some deontological constraints against killing, 
harming, and so on—provided that these constraints do not typically rule out a high proportion of 
the Pareto optimal distributions of wellbeing. 
 It’s important to note that requirement that the constraints on equality promotion be 
relatively weak is crucial to generating the problem of mice. The simple version of the problem 
can be avoided if the constraints need not be relatively weak. For example, if the constraint of 
efficiency is strengthened from Pareto optimality to total wellbeing maximization (i.e., 
utilitarianism), then the problem need not arise in its simple form. In this case, equality would 
play the limited role of selecting among those distributions that maximize the total. Given that 
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typical mice are much less efficient than typical humans at generating wellbeing from 
resources—at least once their basic needs are met—this view will typically require that mice get 
some resources, but it will not require that they get as much as humans. 
There are other ways that the problem can be avoided by imposing relative strong 
constraints prior to the demands of equality. For example, there may be an agent-neutral neutral 
constraint requiring that all rational agents have (to the extent possible) minimally adequate 
levels of wellbeing. Alternatively, there may be an agent-relative constraint requiring that all 
members of one’s species have minimally adequate levels of wellbeing. If the minimally 
adequate level is set high enough, each of these constraints would radically limit the demands of 
equality (and thus not be relatively weak) and thus avoid the requirement for a massive shift 
from humans to mice. 
 Moderate egalitarianism can, as I have indicated, be challenged on several grounds. 
Nonetheless, many (myself included) find it highly plausible. In what follows, I shall simply 
assume that it is true and investigate how the problematic conclusion can be avoided for 
moderate egalitarianism. 
It’s worth noting, however, that, although we shall focus on egalitarianism, the 
problematic conclusion can arise for any theory of morality that gives significant concern to 
providing benefits to those whose level of wellbeing is low in a certain sense. Thus, for example, 
the problem can arise for sufficientarian theories of morality, which require that each 
individual’s level of wellbeing be adequate in some specified sense. If the level of adequacy is, 
for example, set in a species-independent way somewhere between the average level for mice 
and the average level for humans, sufficientarianism will require a massive shifting of resources 
from humans to mice. The problem can also arise for leximin prioritarianism and for forms of 
weighted total prioritarianism that give significantly greater weight to those whose wellbeing 
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level is lower. For simplicity, however, we shall focus on moderate egalitarianism. 
 The final assumption in the argument for the problematic conclusion is Fortune as 
Wellbeing. This holds that fortune—that which is to be equalized—is wellbeing, initial 
opportunity for wellbeing, or brute luck wellbeing (i.e., impact on wellbeing of events that the 
individual could not reasonably have influenced). Obviously, the claim that wellbeing is the sole 
source of that which is to be equalized is controversial. Alternative possibilities include 
capabilities (i.e., effective opportunities to function), the competitive value (based on supply and 
demand) of resources, and primary goods (i.e., resources the possession of which are in an 
individual’s interest, no matter what her conception of the good). Although I shall continue to 
focus on wellbeing, the problem arises for these conceptions of fortune as well. The problem is 
particularly acute for wellbeing and capabilities, since each assesses the value of resources for an 
individual in terms of their value for the individual (as opposed to their value in general). 
Individuals, such as mice, that (beyond some minimal level) are poor converters of resources into 
what ultimately matters (wellbeing or capabilities) thus need more resources to achieve the 
requisite equality. The problem also arises, although in a diminished form, for resources and 
primary goods. Because these views are not sensitive to what a particular individual can do with 
resources, they do not require giving mice larger shares to compensate for their more limited 
abilities to convert resources into wellbeing or capabilities. Nonetheless, given the other 
assumptions, these views do require giving mice an equal share of resources or primary goods, 
and even this seems absurd. 
 One final point: Old-style egalitarianism tended to require that outcome advantage (e.g., 
wellbeing) be equalized, but contemporary egalitarianism tends to favor initial opportunity for 
advantage, or brute luck advantage, on the grounds that they leave greater room for 
accountability for one’s choices. The problem at hand, however, does not depend on this issue, 
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and for brevity I shall therefore use the term ‘wellbeing’ to cover wellbeing, initial opportunity 
for wellbeing, and brute luck wellbeing. For simplicity I shall typically focus on outcome 
wellbeing. 
 Something about Fortune as Wellbeing is, we shall assume, right. Nonetheless, in what 
follows, I shall examine several ways of modifying it so as to avoid the problematic conclusion. 
 
3. Fortune as species-potential ratio-wellbeing 
Fortune as Wellbeing holds that fortune (the equalisandum of equality) is wellbeing, where 
outcome wellbeing is understood as the quality of life on some absolute scale. The problematic 
conclusion arises because the wellbeing of a typical mouse is much lower than that of almost all 
humans. The most commonsensical way of avoiding this problem is to hold that fortune must be 
understood as wellbeing relativized to the potential of the species of the individual. More 
specifically, fortune can be understood as wellbeing relativized to the maximum potential 
wellbeing level for a member of the individual’s species. Consider, then: 
 
Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Species-Potential: Fortune for an individual is the ratio of 
her wellbeing to the species-maximum wellbeing.4  
 
 Suppose, for example, that the maximum wellbeing for mice is 2, and a particular mouse 
has wellbeing of 1. Her fortune, on this conception is .5 (=1/2). Suppose that maximum 
wellbeing for humans is 200 and that a particular human has wellbeing of 100. His fortune is also 
.5 (=100/200). On this conception of fortune, moderate egalitarianism does not require any shift 
of resources between the two. More generally, although this will require some shifting of 
resources from some humans to some mice (and from some mice to some humans), it does not 
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require a massive shift of resources from most humans to most mice. 
This account of fortune avoids the problematic conclusion, but it is implausible because 
of its speciesism. Consider a severely cognitively impaired human who has the innate potential 
(e.g., potential at conception) of a normal mouse. Why would morality be more concerned in 
principle with the human than with the mouse? Of course, there may be various contingent 
factors related to species that are relevant (e.g., how much others care about the individual), but 
there seems little reason to think that there is any principled difference. In any case, although this 
is controversial, I shall assume that speciesism is untenable.5 We shall assume, that is: 
 
Species-Neutrality: Morality makes no essential reference to the species of individuals. 
 
Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Species-Potential violates Species-Neutrality, and thus 
must be rejected. Nonetheless, the idea that fortune is some kind of potential-relative wellbeing 
has some plausibility. In what follows, I shall formulate and assess two such approaches that 
satisfy Species-Neutrality. 
 
4. Individual potentiality 
In what follows, we shall assume the following:  
 
Fortune as Positively Sensitive to Wellbeing: An individual’s fortune is positively sensitive to 
her wellbeing.  
 
 Fortune as Wellbeing and Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Species-Potential each satisfy 
this condition, but so do other conceptions. This condition leaves open how inter-individual 
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(‘interpersonal’) comparisons of fortune are made. It allows, for example, that a mouse with 
wellbeing of .8 may have greater fortune than a human with wellbeing of 10. 
 If fortune is wellbeing, then, given the other assumptions, the problematic conclusion 
follows. If the problem of mice is to be avoided, then fortune must, it seems, be understood as 
some kind of potential-relative wellbeing. The species-potential-relative account of fortune 
avoids the problem of mice, but errs in appealing to the potentials of members of the individual’s 
species. It thus may seem plausible that fortune is wellbeing relativized to the potential of the 
individual:  
 
Individual Potential Relativity: Fortune for an individual is somehow relative to her individual 
potential for wellbeing. 
 
 I shall ultimately argue against this condition, but it will be useful first to explore its 
implications. We shall explore some ways of avoiding the problematic conclusion, given 
Moderate Egalitarianism, Sufficiency of Wellbeing for Moral Standing, Mouse Wellbeing, 
Species-Neutrality, Fortune as Positively Sensitive to Wellbeing, and Individual Potential 
Relativity. 
 First, however, a few remarks on the notion of individual potential are in order. This is a 
slippery notion, and I shall not be able to fully pin it down fully. The one thing that is clear is 
that the relevant potential is not the current one that an individual happens to have at the time of 
application. It is rather the individual’s innate potential. This includes at least the full potential 
that the individual had when she first came into existence. Thus, although the passage of time in 
general reduces one’s current potentials (e.g., from aging, accidents, and or failure to develop 
various capacities), and never increases them6, this does not affect the relevant potential for the 
12 
purposes of assessing fortune. 
 There are, however, several different ways that innate potential can be understood. On a 
relatively narrow understanding, one’s innate potential is the empirical potential that one had 
when one first existed. On the broadest understanding—metaphysical potentiality—one’s innate 
potential also includes all the possibilities that one might have had, given all the ways that one 
might have come to exist. Suppose, for example, that when I came into existence I had no 
empirical potential for sight. Suppose, however, that there are many ways that the sperm and egg 
that produced me might have been altered (e.g., by genetic engineering) prior to my conception 
while still producing me. On the broad understanding of innate potential, my potential includes 
these possibilities as well. If on one of these I have sight, then my potential so understood 
includes sight. 
 In specifying an individual’s potential, it’s crucial that the alternative possibilities 
involved are ones in which that same individual comes into existence, and not merely ones in 
which someone like her comes into existence. Although I’m skeptical that the relevant notion of 
individual identity is robust enough to apply much beyond the narrow notion of possibility 
(empirically possible when one comes into existence), I shall assume, for the sake of argument, 
that we can make sense of individual identity even where individuals come into existence in 
different ways, in different world histories, and even in different worlds. 
 A second open issue concerns how wellbeing is to be relativized to potential wellbeing. 
For simplicity, I shall assume that such relativization is based somehow on the individual’s 
maximum potential wellbeing. One might also invoke minimum potential wellbeing as well 
(since this is variable among individuals), but I shall assume that the relevant minimum is zero, 
where this represents the point that separates a life worth living from one worth not living. I 
make this assumption both for simplicity of presentation and because, given that morality is 
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concerned with making lives better, variations in how miserable a being can be do not seem 
relevant for determination of the relevant minimum level of wellbeing. Given that all beings will 
be assumed to have the same relevant minimum of zero, we can effectively ignore the minimum 
for the issues at hand. In any case, it will be useful to make this assumption for the purposes of 
simplifying the presentation. 
 How then is the maximum set? The most natural possibility for the specification of the 
maximum is as the maximum wellbeing that is possible in principle for the individual given her 
innate potential. It is possible, however, that there is no maximum: for any given level of 
wellbeing, there could be a higher one that is possible for that individual. One way that this can 
arise is where there is no maximum but there is a lowest bound on the maximum, as in the 
progression 1/2, 3/4, 7/8, …. (which is always smaller than 1). In this case, we can take the 
maximum to be the least upper bound (1 in this case). More problematic is the case where there 
is no least upper bound , as in the progression 1, 2, 3, 4, … This is an important problem, and I 
have no solution. As a practical matter, we can deal with this by taking the maximum for such 
individuals to be (for example) a trillion times the maximum ever achieved by any individual in 
the past. This leaves the theoretical problem, but eliminates any significant practical problem. In 
any case, I’m going to ignore this important problem. 
 These are all important and controversial issues, but I shall not attempt to resolve them. I 
shall simply assume that we have a plausible and well-defined conception of innate potential and 
of the maximum individual wellbeing relative to that potential. (I will, in any case, argue below 
that fortune should not be understood as wellbeing relativized to potential.) 
 
5. Fortune as individual potential-relative wellbeing 
We shall here consider three different ways of relativizing wellbeing to individual potential. The 
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first two, I shall argue are clearly implausible, whereas something like the third approach seems 
to be the most plausible way of taking fortune to being potential-relative wellbeing. Nonetheless, 
in later sections, I will argue that even it is implausible and defend a different kind of approach. 
 
5.1 Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Individual-Potential 
The most natural way of relativizing wellbeing to the individual’s potential is the following: 
  
Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Individual-Potential: The fortune of an individual is the 
ratio of her wellbeing to her maximum wellbeing.  
 
This is just like Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Species-Potential, except that the relevant 
potential is individual potential and not species potential. Consider, for example, (1) a mouse 
with wellbeing of 1 and a maximum wellbeing of 2, and (2) a human with wellbeing of 100 and a 
maximum potential wellbeing of 200. Each has wellbeing as ratio of individual potential of .5. 
Equality of wellbeing as ratio of individual potential requires no shift of resources between the 
two. 
 This view avoids the problematic conclusion because it does not compare the wellbeing 
of mice with the wellbeing being of humans (or any other individual). It only compares 
wellbeing as a ratio of individual potential. Equality of fortune so understood thus does not 
demand that mice have lives equally good with humans.  
The main problem with this approach is that it treats some trivial improvements in 
wellbeing as just as important as very significant improvements. Suppose that a 1-unit difference 
in wellbeing is trivial and that a difference of 100 units is significant. Consider a mouse with 
maximum wellbeing of 2 units. Suppose that the only other individual is a human with a 
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maximum wellbeing of 200 units. Suppose that the only choices are 0 wellbeing for the mouse 
and 100 units of wellbeing for the human, or 1 unit for the mouse and 0 for the human. Equality 
of wellbeing as ratio of individual potential views these as equally acceptable. The first option 
gives the mouse a .5 ratio of potential and the human a 0 ratio. The second option gives the 
mouse a 0 ratio and the human a .5 ratio. With respect to equality of wellbeing as a ratio of 
individual potential, there is no difference between the two. It is, however, quite implausible, to 
treat the trivial 1 unit improvement for the mouse as equally as important as the significant 100 
unit for the human. The objection here is not against equality as such. We are assuming that 
some sort of equality is indeed required. The objection is simply to taking the ratio of wellbeing 
to individual potential as the equalisandum. 
 In sum, Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Individual Potential avoids the problematic 
conclusion, but goes overboard and attaches too much importance to providing benefits to mice. 
(This problem, it’s worth noting, also arises for the Fortune as Wellbeing as Ratio of Species 
Potential, considered above.) 
 
5.2 Fortune as closeness to maximum potential 
Let us now consider a second individual potential-relative account of fortune: 
 
Fortune as Closeness to Maximum Potential: Fortune for an individual is the closeness of her 
wellbeing to her maximum potential wellbeing. 
 
 Like the preceding view, this relativizes to maximum (individual) potential wellbeing, 
but it does so in a different way. Instead of viewing fortune as a ratio of wellbeing to maximum 
potential, it views it as the shortfall in wellbeing from each individual’s maximum potential. In 
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the above example, the mouse with 1 unit of wellbeing is 1 unit short of her maximum of 2, and 
the human with 100 units is 100 units short of his maximum of 200. Thus, the mouse is much 
closer to her maximum than the human is to his. Both views hold that fortune increases the closer 
one gets to one’s maximum. The difference concerns whether closeness is viewed in percentage 
terms or absolute terms. Fortune as Closeness to Maximum Potential views closeness in absolute 
terms and thus avoids the problem of treating trivial shortfalls as equally significant for fortune 
as very significant shortfalls.7 
 The closeness to maximum potential account also avoids the problematic conclusion. 
Like the previous view, it does not require that mice have as much wellbeing as humans. It only 
requires that (to the extent possible) the shortfall of mice from their respective maxima be the 
same as that for humans. Nonetheless, this view, I shall now argue, is also implausible. 
 The main problem with this view is that it seems to give inadequate attention to mice. It 
has, for example, significantly less effective concern for mice than utilitarianism. Utilitarianism 
factors in the benefits to mice along with those to others, but, given that, beyond basic needs, 
most mice are much less efficient at generating wellbeing from resources than most humans, 
they tend to receive much fewer resources than humans. This is not obviously problematic. The 
closeness to the maximum potential view, however, tends to favor humans for a second reason: 
even where a given human and a given mouse would reap the same benefit (in absolute terms) 
from a given resource, the closeness to potential will tend to favor the human on the ground that 
her shortfall from her maximum potential is greater than that of the mouse. This is because the 
potential range in wellbeing for typical humans (e.g., 0-200) is much greater than that for typical 
mice (e.g., 0-2). As a result, almost all humans have a greater shortfall from their maxima than 
almost all mice. The closeness to the maximum view thus does not take the interests of mice 
seriously enough. 
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5.3 Fortune as excess over relevant intermediate wellbeing  
As we have seen, equality cannot be merely concerned with (absolute) wellbeing. Otherwise, 
almost all mice have greater equality claims than almost all humans. We are considering 
approaches that relativize wellbeing to individual potential. One view is to take fortune to be 
wellbeing as ratio of individual maximum potential. This is implausible because it treats some 
trivial improvements for disadvantaged mice as more important than some significant 
improvements for disadvantaged humans with a normal human range for wellbeing. This 
suggests that shortfalls should be understood in absolute terms, but the reference point should be 
selected in some potential-relative way. Selecting the reference point as the maximum potential, 
I have suggested, inappropriately disadvantages beings with lower potentials (since their 
shortfalls will typically be smaller). This suggests that the reference point should be some level 
of wellbeing between zero and the maximum. 
 One possibility is to appeal to the mid-point between zero and a person’s maximum 
potential. This seems, however, rather arbitrary. It seems more plausible to appeal to (something 
like) the maximum average potential-relative wellbeing ratio at the time of evaluation, where 
this is understood as follows. The potential-relative wellbeing ratio is (as defined earlier) the 
ratio of wellbeing to the individual’s maximum wellbeing. At a given time, given the total 
resources in the world, there is a maximum achievable average potential-relative wellbeing ratio 
for the set of beings with moral standing. For example, if there are just two individuals and one 
can give them ratios of .7 and .3 respectively (average of .5) or .4 and .8 respectively (average of 
.6), the maximum achievable average potential-relative wellbeing is .6. For a given individual, 
his/her maximum average potential-relative wellbeing point (at that time) is that level of 
(absolute) wellbeing that gives him/her the maximum average potential-relative wellbeing ratio. 
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Note that maximum average potential-relative wellbeing ratio is a number between 0 and 1, 
whereas the maximum average potential-relative wellbeing point is the level of absolute 
wellbeing that, for a given individual, represents the maximum average potential-relative 
wellbeing (at that time). For example, if maximum average potential-relative wellbeing ratio is .3 
(i.e., the best one can do on average is to give individuals 30% of their maximum potential 
wellbeing), then for an individual with a maximum of 10, her maximum average potential-
relative wellbeing point is 3. 
 Fortunately, we don’t need to resolve this the issue of how an intermediate reference 
point is selected—since I will argue against more general features of this approach. Let us simply 
assume that there is some principled basis for selecting each individual’s relevant intermediate 
level of wellbeing (e.g., as some percentage of his/her maximum). Let us consider, then: 
 
Fortune as Excess over Relevant Intermediate Wellbeing: Fortune, for a given individual, is 
the excess of wellbeing over her relevant intermediate level of wellbeing (where shortfalls are 
negative excesses, and thus cases of misfortune). 
 
 Fortune, on this view—as with the previous view—is concerned with absolute 
differences of wellbeing from a reference point, and the reference point is picked out, for each 
individual, in individual potential-relative way. The new feature is that the reference point is 
some level of wellbeing between zero and the maximum. This reduces (but does not eliminate) 
the extent to which individuals with great potentials will tend to have greater shortfalls from the 
reference point. For example, if the reference point were set at the zero point, this tendency 
would be entirely eliminated.  
With an appropriately set reference point, this approach may seem to give the right 
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balance to the wellbeing of mice and humans. A mouse and a human who are each at their 
respective reference points are deemed to have equal claims with respect to equality. 
Furthermore, each has, from the point of view of equality, less priority than any being who has 
less than her reference point. Thus, there will be some redistribution from humans who are above 
their reference point to individuals who are below. For individuals below their reference point, 
however, humans will tend to have a stronger equality claim than mice. This is because their 
shortfall will typically be larger. Thus, to the extent that there is a shifting of resources from 
individuals who have more than their reference point to individuals who have less than their 
reference point, it will tend to be a shift from humans (since human excesses are typically larger 
than mouse excesses) to humans (since human shortfalls are typically larger than mouse 
shortfalls). 
 Fortune as Excess over Relevant Intermediate Wellbeing, or something like it, is, I 
speculate, the most promising individual potential-relative account of fortune for a form of 
egalitarianism that rejects speciesism and that includes sentient beings in its scope. Of course, it 
is highly controversial and subject to many objections. The main objection is that it treats 
differences in innate potential as given and ineligible for egalitarian compensation. For example, 
consider two individuals with the same level of wellbeing, and the same current capacities for 
wellbeing, but with different potentials for wellbeing. Suppose that one unit of wellbeing can be 
given to one of them but not both of them. According to Fortunate as Excess over Relevant 
Intermediate Wellbeing, the one with the greater potential has lower fortune (since her potential 
is greater, and thus her reference point wellbeing is greater, and thus her shortfall from that point 
is greater (or her excess is smaller). It seems implausible, however, that in this case equality 
requires giving the benefit to the person with the greater potential. This, however, is not a 
conclusive refutation of the view. The problematic conclusion (that morality requires a radical 
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shift of resources from most humans to most mice) is much more implausible. It may be that, 
once speciesism is rejected, the troublesome conclusion just mentioned must be accepted. It may 
be, that is, that all views have troubling conclusions for some cases, and that this is the most 
promising path to take. 
 I shall now argue, however, that there is a deeper problem of interspecies equality that 
this approach does not solve and that an adequate solution does not take fortune to be any form 
of potential-relative wellbeing. 
 
6. The problem of radical enhancement 
Sometime in the future, it will, it seems, become feasible—through genetic engineering and other 
means—to enhance the capacities of mice, or other sentient beings, to be roughly equal to those 
of typical humans.8 In particular, it will be possible to radically enhance the capacity of mice for 
wellbeing. Thus, the maximum potential wellbeing of most mice for wellbeing will be, at least 
roughly, that of most humans. Of course, the potentials of humans will also be radically 
enhanced, but the difference in the potential for wellbeing between a typical mouse and a typical 
human will arguably eventually become quite small. Moreover, the cost of such enhancement 
will eventually become reasonably small. When this is true, the problematic conclusion returns 
even on the proposed approach. The maximum potential for most mice will be roughly the same 
as that for most humans, and thus unenhanced mice will have greater shortfalls from their 
reference points than most unenhanced humans. Hence, equality will require a radical shift in 
resources from most humans to most mice. 
Of course, if the capacities for wellbeing of mice can be enhanced, then typically their 
productive capacities can also be enhanced. If the latter can be enhanced enough that they 
produce enough wealth to provide for the benefits to which there are entitled (and perhaps 
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more!), then, of course, there is little that is problematic about their enhancement. This, however, 
need not always be possible, and I shall therefore focus on the case where it is not. 
 The possibility of radical enhancement generates the problematic conclusion only if the 
enhanced mice are the same individuals as the original mice. Otherwise, the original mice (as 
opposed to different beings) do not have the potential for the enhanced capacities. This places 
some constraints on the relevant enhancements of mouse potentials, but it seems plausible that 
there is no barrier in principle to such radical enhancement of the capacity for wellbeing while 
maintaining the relevant individual identity. Indeed, for individuals, such as mice, whose moral 
standing is grounded entirely in their capacity for wellbeing, it seems plausible that the relevant 
identity is simply that of being the same center of wellbeing, and it seems plausible that radical 
enhancement can preserve this. In any case, in what follows, I shall tentatively assume that this is 
so. 
 The possibility of radical enhancement has significant implications for the problematic 
conclusion. One, just noted, is that even if innate potential is understood narrowly as the 
practically achievable potential that one had when one first came into existence (i.e., roughly, 
what the then current knowledge, resources, and technology permitted us to achieve reliably at 
will), someday the potential of mice in this sense will be roughly that of humans (although they 
do not currently have that potential). A second implication is that this is true now, if innate 
potential is understood more broadly as the empirically possible potential that one had when one 
first came into existence (i.e., roughly, the possibilities left open by the laws of nature given the 
state of the world then). The mere fact that one day we will be able to implement radical 
enhancement is enough to show that it is, and always has been, empirically possible, even if we 
do not know how to bring about these results now. Of course, this is also true if innate potential 
is understood more broadly still, such as including all metaphysical possibilities compatible with 
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being the same individual. 
 The lesson seems to be this. Assessing fortune in a potential-relative way makes some 
difference, since typically at least some individuals have different potentials. Given the 
possibility of radical enhancement, however, the difference seems not to be as great as we have 
thought. This is especially so if potential is understood in the broadest metaphysical sense. It 
seems still to be so (although to a lesser extent) if potential is understood in the sense of 
empirical possibility. If potential, however, is understood in the relative narrow sense of practical 
possibility, then there is currently a lot of variation in potential-relative wellbeing. Even that 
difference, however, will significantly diminish with the advancement of technology, and the 
problem of those demanding little mice will eventually return.9 
 Thus, it may seem that, if we are to avoid permanently the problematic conclusion, we 
need to narrow further the notion of innate potential. I shall suggest, however, that this is not 
promising. 
 Jeff McMahan (2002: ch. 2) suggests that we limit the relevant potentials to intrinsic 
potentials, where these are something like the (e.g., empirical) potentials that individuals have, 
the realization of which do not involve ‘direct alteration of their constitution’. The rough idea is 
that one’s intrinsic potential is somehow based solely on one ‘internal’ condition and not on 
‘external’ conditions such as the presence or absence of the possibility of adding body parts (e.g., 
eyeballs, brain cells, or synthetic circuitry). If, for example, given the right training environment, 
mice could develop the same capacities as humans (which they can’t), then their intrinsic 
potentials would be the same as those of humans. The mere fact that genetic engineering, or 
other direct physical alterations, would enhance a mouse’s potential, however, would not 
establish that mice have the same intrinsic potentials as humans.10 Hence, if potentials are 
restricted to intrinsic potentials, the problematic conclusion does not arise—at least not so easily. 
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 There are two problems with this approach—each acknowledged by McMahan. One is 
that it’s not clear that there is much content to the distinction between intrinsic (as here 
understood) and unrestricted potentials. What one realizes depends on the kind of nourishment 
one obtains (which is a kind of external contribution), but that is taken not to make the potential 
for such achievement non-intrinsic. Otherwise no potentials would be intrinsic. Consider then a 
mental enhancement pill. It would seem also not to make the potential it generates non-
intrinsic—even, say, if the pill promotes neural connections. Why then, wouldn’t the possibility 
of surgery that establishes various neural connections also enhance one’s intrinsic potential? All 
realizations depend both on internal and on external conditions, and almost all involve enhancing 
internal constitution by external means. It is thus unclear what the distinction is supposed to be 
between internal potentials (which do not require direct alteration of one’s constitution) and non-
internal ones. 
 The second problem with restricting innate potentials to those that do not require direct 
alteration of one’s constitution (assuming that the intuitive content is capturable) is its 
plausibility. As McMahan (2002:153) notes, this view has the implication that an innately blind 
infant, whose condition is easily and cheaply correctible, has less relevant (i.e., intrinsic) 
potential than an innately normal infant who acquired the same condition as a result of an 
accident shortly after coming into existence. In both cases, the needed treatment involves altering 
their internal constitution. The only difference is that the innately normal infant had the intrinsic 
potential for sight when she came into existence, whereas the innately blind infant did not. It 
strikes most of us as wildly implausible to hold that this difference is relevant to assessing their 
fortune. In a very real sense the innately defective infant has the potential to have normal 
capacities. It seems quite arbitrary to treat her differently than the other infant. Of course, this is 
not a knock-down objection. We are dealing with cases where some of our strongly held 
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intuitions must be given up. Nonetheless, I claim that it is more plausible to treat the enhanceable 
mouse as having the same relevant potential as the normal human being than to treat the two 
infants differently. Thus, the restriction to intrinsic potential so understood seems unpromising. 
 Perhaps there is some other relevant way to characterize intrinsic potentials, but I shall 
not pursue that possibility here.11 This is because there is a general problem with restricting 
potential more narrowly than empirical possibility when the individual came into existence (and 
perhaps even that restriction is problematic). The empirical possibilities open to an individual 
when she comes into existence are real (as opposed to counterfactual) possibilities for that 
individual. It therefore seems quite arbitrary to ignore some of them for the purposes of 
specifying fortune. For example, limiting potential to practical potential (potential that is, 
roughly, reliably realizable) seems arbitrary. Of course, practical limitations are highly relevant 
for what we should do in practice (e.g., there is no point in trying to accomplish something for 
which we don’t have the know-how). It seems inappropriate, however, to assess fortune in a way 
that ignores in principle certain empirical possibilities merely because they are not now practical 
possibilities. Likewise, it seems inappropriate to assess fortune solely on the basis intrinsic 
empirical potential, however that is understood. Why should differences in real potential be 
ignored? 
 If this is right, and if, as we have been assuming, radical enhancement of potential 
wellbeing is empirically possible for mice, then taking fortune to be relative to individual 
potential may somewhat reduce the requirement to shift resources from most normal humans to 
most normal mice, but it leaves in place a very strong requirement for such transfers. If the 
problematic conclusion is to be robustly avoided, some additional machinery is, it seems, 
needed. Before concluding, I shall propose some such machinery. 
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7. A possible solution 
So far we have explored ways of avoiding the problematic conclusion that take fortune to be 
wellbeing relativized to individual potential. We have seen two main problems with this 
approach. First, as just noted, given the possibility of radical enhancement, it does not avoid the 
problematic conclusion (since the potentials of mice are may not be that different from ours). 
Second, as noted earlier, it implausibly takes brute luck limitations in innate potential (e.g., of a 
human) as demanding no egalitarian compensation (since fortune is relative to innate potentials). 
 I believe that we have taken a false turn. Instead of focusing on the potential for 
wellbeing, we should, I believe, focus on the capacity for wellbeing. A capacity is something 
that can be realized now, whereas a potential can be something that can be realized only at some 
later time after the capacity is developed. Thus, for example, most normal adults now have the 
potential to play a simple piece on the piano (i.e., after much practice to develop their capacities), 
but only a few adults now have the capacity to do so. I shall suggest that fortune should be 
understood as wellbeing relativized to the degree of moral standing, where moral standing is 
grounded in the capacities of the individuals (rather than in their potentials). 
 The solution that I shall sketch requires several significant departures from the standard 
way of thinking of things. The best I can do here is to formulate and motivate this approach. I 
will not attempt anything close to a rigorous defense. Indeed, the following is highly speculative, 
and should be understood merely as identifying an approach that needs to be developed and 
assessed more carefully. 
 I shall introduce six ideas, which taken together offer the promise a plausible way of 
avoiding the problematic conclusion. Consider, then: 
 
Idea 1: Moral standing is grounded in the capacity for wellbeing and the capacity for rational 
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choice.  
 
This is a strengthening of Sufficiency of Wellbeing for Moral Standing. It recognizes that 
capacity for rational choice is also relevant for moral standing, and further claims that nothing 
else is. Of course, this claim is not uncontroversial. Those who hold that moral standing is 
grounded in the possession of a Cartesian soul or in being a member of certain species would 
reject it. Most moral theorists, however, would accept this assumption, and I shall not here 
attempt to defend it. 
 In what follows, I shall, for simplicity, ignore the capacity for rational choice. This is 
because, for the problem at hand, that capacity is not relevant. Those with the capacity for 
rational choice are protected by the morality of respect, and this requires, roughly, that their 
autonomous wills be respected in various ways. Moderate egalitarianism may indeed impose 
various constraints on respecting the wills of autonomous agents, but such respect does not block 
the problematic conclusion (e.g., where the issue is simply of how to divide up resources). Thus, 
for simplicity, I shall focus below solely on the morality of interests, and for this purpose we can 
ignore the capacity for rational choice (except, of course, as it contingently impact on wellbeing). 
Given this simplifying assuming, we shall assume that moral standing is grounded solely in the 
capacity for wellbeing. 
 This leads naturally to: 
 
Idea 2: Moral standing (for the morality of interests) comes in degrees, with zero for no moral 
standing, and, for example, one unit for the current average degree of moral standing for normal 
humans with normal lives.  
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 If moral standing is grounded solely in the capacity for wellbeing, then it is natural to 
think that moral standing comes in degrees, given that the capacity comes in degrees. This does 
not, however, follow as a matter of logic. Full moral standing may be (and has typically taken to 
be) a threshold concept: Those who have the grounding features above some specified degree 
have full moral standing. The concept of being a dollar millionaire is a threshold concept. 
Everyone who has at least one million dollars is a millionaire. A person with just one million 
dollars has the same status in this regard as a billionaire. Full moral standing has typically been 
taken to be a threshold concept. All normal human beings, for example, are taken to have the 
same full moral standing (for the morality of interests). When we focus on normal adult human 
beings, this seems plausible, given that our capacities are all roughly equal. Moreover, it is 
seemingly natural to extend this idea to sentient fetuses, young children, and severely cognitively 
disabled people. 
Once, however, we start to consider sentient individuals of all the various species, the 
implausibility of treating moral standing as a threshold concept becomes apparent. Consider two 
individuals one of whom spends her life just below the threshold capacity for wellbeing (perhaps 
a snail) and the other who spends her entire life just above it (perhaps a squid). The former has 
no moral standing whereas the latter has some moral standing. It would be crazy, however, to 
think that the individual who just barely has the capacity for wellbeing (e.g., the squid) has the 
same moral standing as a normal human adult human (who has a much greater capacity for 
wellbeing). Such a small difference in capacities cannot make such an enormous difference in 
moral standing. This is especially clear in the context of egalitarian theory where full moral 
standing would generate a claim to equal benefits with all others. It is also true more generally in 
the context of theories that hold (as I believe plausible) that we have no duty to ensure that 
individuals who would have good lives acquire moral standing but do have a duty to ensure (to 
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the extent possible) that those with moral standing have good lives. Development of the relevant 
capacities for moral standing from slightly below to slightly above some threshold does not make 
a big difference in our duties to make sure that the life goes well (which is not to deny that it 
does make some difference). It thus seems that we need to recognize degrees of moral standing.12 
Obviously, the issue is complex and highly controversial, but I cannot defend it here. 
 We are finally ready for the core of the solution (although more qualification will be 
given below):  
 
Idea 3: Fortune is wellbeing relativized to degree of moral standing, such that (1) zero wellbeing 
represents zero fortune, and (2) for a given level of wellbeing, fortune is inversely related to 
moral standing (i.e., increasing moral standing reduces fortune, for a given level of wellbeing). 
 
 The idea is that a mouse and a human both have zero fortune if each has zero wellbeing, 
and that, for a given level of wellbeing, the fortune (that which is to be equalized) of the mouse 
is greater than that of the human. To make this more concrete, I shall make the following 
assumption: 
 
Working Assumption 1: For non-negative levels of wellbeing, fortune is divided by degree of 
moral standing.13 
 
 Suppose that a mouse has moral standing of .01 and a human has moral standing of 1. If 
the mouse has wellbeing of 1 and the human wellbeing of 100, then they each have fortune of 
100. The relativization to the degree of moral standing thus seems to avoid the problematic 
conclusion. Mice have a claim on resources, but, because their moral standing it typically much 
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lower than that of most humans, their claim is much weaker. This idea also seems independently 
plausible. A being with no moral standing has no claims on us (by definition). Given that moral 
standing comes in degrees, it seems plausible that a being who has a very low degree of moral 
standing (e.g., only slightly above no moral standing) has only very weak claims on us.14 
 There are two issues that need to be addressed about how the degree of moral standing is 
determined. One is that moral standing, I believe, needs to be relative to possible actions, and not 
independent of what action is performed. This is admittedly a very unusual idea. To motivate it, 
consider a situation in which there is a (presentient) zygote and one can perform one of three 
possible actions (where no one else is affected): (1) allow the zygote to die, (2) provide 
sustenance for the zygote, in which case it goes on to live a very good life with normal human 
capacities, and (3) provide partial sustenance, in which case it goes on to live a poor life (but 
worth living) with normal human capacities. If one ensures that the zygote dies, it never acquires 
moral standing, and it thus not wronged. Even though it could have had a very good life, failure 
to provide that life does not wrong the zygote because it ensures that the zygote never acquires 
the relevant capacities for moral standing. (Those who think that a zygote already has moral 
standing can change the example to one combining a particular sperm and egg, or failing to do 
so, to produce a particular possible person.) Nonetheless, providing only partial sustenance to the 
zygote, I claim, wrongs the zygote. In that case, the zygote does acquire the relevant capacities 
and is needlessly made to live a poor life. I believe that the most plausible way of making sense 
of this is to say that moral standing is relative to the action performed. The zygote has no moral 
standing relative to an action that ensures that it dies prior to acquiring the relevant capacities, 
but has full moral standing relative to an action that ensures that it acquires normal human 
capacities. It is thus wronged by the action that needlessly deprives it of benefits. 
 Consider then: 
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Idea 4: For a given choice situation of a given agent, the degree of moral standing that an 
affected individual has is action-relative (i.e., depends on which action the agent performs). 
 
 This idea is highly controversial, and there are other ways of addressing the problem just 
raised. Nonetheless, I believe that relativizing moral standing to action performed is 
independently plausible.15 My goal here, however, is not to defend it, but simply to identify it 
and to show how it can help avoid the problematic conclusion. 
 The final main question that we must address, before I illustrate how this general 
approach seems to avoid the problematic conclusion, concerns how the degree of moral standing 
is grounded in past, present (just prior to action), and future capacities for wellbeing. Clearly, the 
present capacities are relevant. Moreover, future capacities, I have already suggested above, are 
also relevant: A being with no past or present capacity for wellbeing (such as a presentient fetus) 
has moral standing relative to an action for which she later develops that capacity (and thus can 
be wronged by that action). Finally, past capacities are also relevant. If they were not, then a 
normal adult who temporarily lost her capacity for wellbeing would not be wronged if she were 
then killed (since she would never have the relevant capacities now or in the future). Hence, the 
past is somehow relevant. Once, however, an individual has lost all potential for present and 
future capacities for wellbeing, she no longer has, I claim, any moral standing (dead people have 
no moral standing). Hence, the past is relevant only if there is present or future potential for the 
capacity for wellbeing. 
This leads us to: 
 
 
Idea 5: The degree of moral standing that an individual has relative to a given action depends 
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positively on (1) the current capacity for wellbeing, (2) each of the various empirical possibilities 
for future capacity for wellbeing if that action is performed, and (3) if there is a least some 
present or future potential for the capacity for wellbeing, on past capacity for wellbeing of at 
least some past times. 
 
 This leaves open exactly how the degree of moral standing is determined, and it seems 
that any possible function of past, present, and possible future capacities has some problematic 
implications. I shall not attempt to resolve this issue here. Instead, I shall simply make the 
following working assumption for illustration: 
 
Working Assumption 2: The degree of moral standing that an individual has relative to given 
action is the expected average capacity for wellbeing that she has over the course of her life if 
that action is performed (but zero if the individual has no current or future potential for the 
capacity for wellbeing at the time the action is performed). 
 
 Implicit in this assumption is the view that future capacities are discounted for their 
probability. An individual that has no past or present capacities, and only a very small chance of 
a future high capacity has a low degree of moral standing. She might, however, have a high 
degree of moral standing if the future capacities were great and highly likely. Also implicit in 
this working assumption is the view that all past capacities matter equally. One might, on the 
contrary, hold that only the recent past matters, or that the past matters more the closer it is to the 
present. This whole issue is complex and murky, and I fully agree that there is no simple 
answer.16 Nonetheless, I believe that the general idea of Idea 5 is plausible. I will invoke 
Working Assumption 2 simply as a way of illustrating the idea. 
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 Let us now consider an example that illustrates how these ideas help avoid the 
problematic conclusion. Suppose for simplicity that there is just one mouse (M) with current and 
past capacities for wellbeing of .01 and just two humans (H1 and H2) with current and past 
capacities for wellbeing of 1. Humans have potential for wellbeing of 100 and the mouse has 
same potential with radical enhancement. For simplicity, I’ll assume radical enhancement of 
mice costs nothing to implement and that further enhancement of humans is not possible. 
 
    Wellbeing   Moral Standing Fortune (WB/MS) 
Possible actions:  M H1 H2 M H1 H2 M H1 H2  
Do Nothing, Unequal Fortune .5 10  50 .01 1 1 50 10 50  
No Enhance, Equal Fortune  .301 30.1 30.1 .01 1 1 30.1 30.1 30.1  
Enhance, Equal Fortune 18.7 20.9 20.9 .9 1 1 20.9 20.9 20.9  
      Table 1 
 
[Table 1 goes here.] 
 
 Here there are three feasible actions. Doing nothing leaves the mouse with low capacities 
and moral standing of .01 (normal mouse standing). Although the mouse gets only .5 wellbeing, 
its fortune (50) is higher than that of H1 (10). Relative to moral standing of .01, .5 wellbeing 
represents greater fortune than 10 units for an individual with moral standing of 1. The second 
feasible action also involves no enhancement, but it distributes wellbeing in a way that equalizes 
fortune. The third feasible action enhances the mouse and then equalizes fortune. 
 What does moderate egalitarianism require in this case? For simplicity, here and below, 
I’ll assume that it requires maximizing equality rather than simply significantly but non-
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maximally promoting it. Nothing of substance depends on this. I also assume that a plausible 
version of egalitarianism will never require leveling down. Instead, it will require choosing a 
most equal distribution of fortune from among those that are Pareto optimal in wellbeing. Pareto 
optimality is a weak kind of efficiency requirement. It requires that it not be possible to improve 
one person’s wellbeing without making someone worse off. Thus, for example <2,2,2> is not 
Pareto optimal when <2,3,4> is also feasible (since the second and third individuals are better off 
and the first person is not worse off). For simplicity, I’ll focus on examples, such as the one 
above, where all the feasible options are Pareto optimal. 
In the above example, all three options are Pareto optimal in wellbeing, and the second 
and third options achieve maximum feasible equality of fortune. Moderate egalitarianism thus 
judges the first option impermissible (since it is less equal than the others) and judges the other 
two permissible (since they are each Pareto optimal in wellbeing and each maximally equal in 
fortune relative to the Pareto optimal set). In this example, then, enhancement of the mice is not 
required, but it is permitted. Thus the problematic conclusion in its strict form is avoided (since 
there is no requirement to radically shift resources to mice), but a weaker form remains: it is 
permissible to radically shift resources to mice (after enhancing them). This is less problematic, 
but it is still significantly problematic. We have not yet, I believe, fully solved the problem. 
 If we add one more twist, we can, I believe, avoid even the weak version of the 
problematic conclusion. The twist (very roughly) is that we strengthen the efficiency requirement 
to give a certain priority to increasing the wellbeing of those whose degree of moral standing is 
not decreased over increasing benefits to those whose degree of moral standing is decreased. 
Consider then: 
 
Idea 6: Efficiency requires that an option, X, be Pareto optimality relative to those options, X, 
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that satisfy the requirement that and such that there is no alternative feasible Pareto optimal 
option, Y, such that: 
(1) for all individuals with same degree of moral standing in X and Y, all have at least as much 
wellbeing in Y and some have more in Y; 
(2) all individuals with higher degree of moral standing in Y than in X, have maximal wellbeing 
for that feasible set; and  
(3) all individuals with lower degree of moral standing in Y than in X, their fortune is at least as 
great in Y as it is in X. 
 
This idea strengthens the efficiency requirement that is prior to the equality requirement. 
It still maintains that Pareto optimality in wellbeing is necessary, but further rules out certain 
those options that are not Pareto optimal in fortune relative to the Pareto optimal (in wellbeing) 
set. The third option above of enhancing the mice fails this requirement, since the second option 
provides more wellbeing to the humans (whose degree of moral standing is not affected) and it 
provides more fortune (although less wellbeing) to the mouse (whose degree of moral standing is 
decreased). The first and second options, however, satisfy this requirement. Given that the first 
option is less equal in fortune than the second, only the second option is permissible. In 
particular, radical enhancement is impermissible, and even the weak problematic conclusion is 
avoided in this case. 
  This strengthened efficiency requirement creates a presumption against enhancement. 
Enhancement increases the moral standing of individuals, and if there is a fixed total of 
wellbeing, then enhancement must decrease the fortune of at least some individuals (and perhaps 
increase no one’s). The above ideas do not, however, entail that radical enhancement is always 
impermissible. Indeed, sometimes they require it. Consider the following case: 
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    Wellbeing   Moral Standing Fortune (WB/MS) 
Possible actions:     M H1 H2 M H1 H2 M H1 H2  
Do Nothing       .1 10.2  50.2 .01 1 1 10 10.2 50.2 
No Enhance, Equalize Humans .1 30.2 30.2 .01 1 1 10 30.2 30.2  
Enhance, Equalize All 18.7 20.9 20.9 .9 1 1 20.9 20.9 20.9  
     Table 2 
[Table 2 goes here.] 
 Here each option satisfies the enhanced efficiency requirement of Idea 6. Enhancement is 
not ruled out in this case, because, although the second option gives more wellbeing to the two 
humans (whose degree of moral standing is unaffected) it does this by reducing the fortune of the 
mouse. Thus, enhancement is not ruled out on efficiency grounds. Moreover, the third option 
(enhance the mouse and then equalize fortune) is the uniquely most equal in fortune (because for 
contingent reasons it is not possible to equalize fortune without enhancement). Hence, only it is 
permissible. Radical enhancement followed by a shift in resources from humans to mice is 
morally required in this case. 
 Some may find even this implication deeply troubling, but I do not. If mice have moral 
standing and are protected by the requirements of equality, then at least sometimes we will be 
required to shift some resources to them and sometimes this will involve radical enhancement. 
This is much less problematic than the implication that morality requires a radical shift of 
resources from most humans to most mice. 
 
8. Speculative conclusion 
We have been exploring the implications of accepting moderate egalitarianism while holding that 
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sentience, as a capacity for wellbeing, is sufficient for moral standing and while rejecting all 
forms of speciesism. We have been seeking a way of avoiding the problematic conclusion that 
morality requires a massive shift of resources from most humans to most mice. I have sketched a 
way of avoiding the problematic conclusion. The demands of equality should be understood as 
something like equality of fortune, relative to the feasible options that are efficient in the 
enhanced sense of Idea 6. Fortune, for a given action, should be understood as wellbeing 
relativized to moral standing if that action is performed—more specifically (for positive 
wellbeing), as wellbeing divided by degree of moral standing. This gives, I suggest, a plausible 
approach to interspecies equality in the simple case where radical enhancement is not possible 
and also in the deep case where it is. 
Even if the specifics of this approach are mistaken, the following two general features of 
this approach are, I claim, independently plausible: (1) Moral standing comes in degrees and 
those who only barely have moral standing have only very weak moral claims. (2) Differences in 
one’s past, present, or future capacities for wellbeing affect the strength one’s moral claims 
(because they affect one’s degree of moral standing), but mere differences in potential for 
wellbeing do not. If two individuals have the same moral standing (grounded in past, present, 
and future capacities) and would reap the same benefit in wellbeing, they have equally strong 
claim to that benefit—even if their potentials are different. 
Admittedly, I have done little more than formulate and motivate this general approach. 
Further analysis may show that it is deeply flawed in unanticipated ways. My only claim here is 
that egalitarians should worry about the problem, and that the proposed solution is at least worth 
considering carefully. Much more analysis is of course needed before we have an adequate sense 
of what kinds of solution are possible, and which are the most plausible.17 
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* This is a slightly revised version of Peter Vallentyne, ‘Of Mice and Men: Equality and 
Animals’, Journal of Ethics ?? (2005?): ??-?? [not yet published]. Copyright 2005 by Springer 
Science and Business Media. Reprinted with the kind permission of Springer Science and 
Business Media. 
 
                                                 
* In addition to miscellaneous stylistic revisions, this version of the paper corrects two errors in 
the original version: Fn. 13 contained a numerical error and Idea 6 was poorly formulated. 
1
 McMahan is, of course, building on the work of Singer (1990). See also, Rachels (1990: ch. 5), 
Persson (1995), Kaufman (1998), Arneson (1999), and Crisp (2003). 
2
 Note that, in any case, restricting moral standing to rationally autonomous agents does not 
avoid the problem. The problem arises, for example, if equality of welfare is required and some 
rationally autonomous agents have only the capacity for welfare that mice have. 
3
 McMahan (1996: 30) suggests such a view. 
4
 This is roughly a specific version of the species-norm account discussed by McMahan (1996, 
2002: ch. 2). Daniels (1990) and Buchanan et al. (2000: ch. 4) appeal to a species-relative 
account but based on capabilities rather than wellbeing. 
5
 McMahan (2002: ch.2), for example, argues against any kind of species-norm account. 
6
 Of course, one’s capacities (i.e., abilities to do things at will) can increase over time (e.g., from 
practice and education), but this is simply the development of a potential that was present all 
along. 
7
 Note that, in the example given, the mouse (who is 1 unit short of her maximum of 2) is 1 unit 
above her minimum, whereas the human (who is 100 units short of his maximum of 200) is 100 
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units above his minimum. A different view of fortune would take fortune to be the excess over 
the minimum. If the minima are the same (e.g., zero), this view is equivalent to Fortune as 
Wellbeing. In any case, it generates the problematic conclusion, since mice will typically have a 
smaller excess. 
8
 McMahan (1996, 2002: 2) insightfully discusses this issue at length. 
9
 It’s worth noting that, if radical enhancement is possible, then even total utilitarianism faces the 
problematic conclusion, once the cost of radical enhancement becomes small. Given decreasing 
marginal wellbeing and roughly identical marginal wellbeing for any two individuals at the same 
level of wellbeing, enhancing mice and then transferring resources to them from humans will 
generally increase total wellbeing. Indeed, this illustrates the point that there is a close 
connection between the problems generated by radical enhancement and problems in population 
policy about adding additional individuals to the world. The latter concerns our duty to add 
beings to the world with a given level of standing, whereas the former concerns our duty to 
increase the moral standing of existing individuals to a given level. 
10
 Of course, once such ‘external enhancements’ have taken place, the mouse’s intrinsic potential 
is enhanced. Likewise, the offspring of mice that have been genetically enhanced to produce 
offspring with enhanced capacities have enhanced intrinsic potentials. The issue here concerns 
the force of the moral reason to provide such enhancement in the first place. 
11
 For example, one might understand intrinsic potential to be those possibilities that the 
individual has in his/her statistically normal (e.g. most common) environment. It seems quite 
arbitrary, however, to limit the relevant potentials to those states that are achievable in 
statistically normal environments. The mere fact that a child cannot overcome dyslexia in 
statistically normal environment surely does not mean that the child does not have the relevant 
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potential to overcome the condition. 
12
 Degrees of moral standing also seem necessary in order to deal adequately with future people 
who will come into existence with less than certainty. I shall suggest below that their standing is 
discounted by the probability of their coming into existence.  
13
 I here sidestep the important issue of how fortune is to be calculated when wellbeing is 
negative. It would be quite implausible to hold that here too it is wellbeing divided by degree of 
moral standing. This would have the result that a mouse with moral standing of .01 and 
wellbeing of -.01 -1 has worse fortune (-100) than a human with moral standing of 1 and 
wellbeing of -99. It would also violate Idea 3’s requirement that for a given level of wellbeing 
(e.g., -1) fortune is inversely related to degree of moral standing (e.g., that a mouse with 
wellbeing of -1 has better fortune than a normal human with -1). One promising way of 
relativizing negative wellbeing is to set fortune equal to wellbeing multiplied (cf. divided) by 
degree of moral standing. This ensures that those with lower degrees of moral standing require 
less wellbeing to achieve a given level of fortune (as required by Idea 3). I shall not, however, 
pursue this important and difficult question. 
14
 It’s worth mentioning that throughout I am putting aside issues of rectification for past wrongs. 
A person who has a low degree of moral standing because her capacities were wrongfully 
thwarted has, I would argue, a claim to have her capacities suitably enhanced, or at least to be 
compensated so that her wellbeing is no lower than it would have been had she not been 
wronged. In any case, this issue is ignored throughout. 
15
 The idea of relativizing moral standing to action performed is similar to the idea, proposed by 
Elizabeth Harman (1999), that moral standing depends (if I understand correctly) on how the 
future turns out. I reject, however, this claim. Moral standing, I claim, is determined at the time 
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of action. It depends only on what action is performed and the probabilities of future events that 
it imposes. It does not depend on which of the possible future events contingently ends up 
occurring. 
16
 Working Assumption 2 entails that two individuals with the same current capacities, and the 
same future capacities if a given action is performed, may nonetheless have different degrees of 
moral standing relative to that action, if they their past capacities are different. Admittedly, this 
seems bizarre. Nonetheless, the past must somehow be relevant. Otherwise, a person who 
temporarily lost her capacity would not be wronged if she were killed. 
17
 For insightful comments, I thank Dick Arneson, Alexander Cappelen, Paula Casal, Matthew 
Clayton, Roger Crisp, Trent Dougherty, Marc Fleurbaey, Nils Holtug, Brad Hooker, Brian 
Kierland, Jeff McMahan, Gene Mills, Mike Otsuka, Thomas Pogge, Mathias Risse, Larry 
Temkin, Bertil Tungodden, Jo Wolff, and the participants in the following colloquia: Kline 
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